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To counter the eﬀects of population aging in rich industrialized coun-
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developing countries are often seen as alternative solutions. In this
paper, we explicitly account for mobility constraints in the form of
immigration restrictions in industrialized countries and expropriation
risk in developing countries to investigate whether eﬃciency gains
from factor movements are likely to be realized. We set up a one-
period general equilibrium model of two economies with young and
old individuals. Emigration from the developing country weakens its
young generation’s expropriation preferences, permitting more FDI.
However, if the bulk of capital is invested abroad, the old investor’s
utility gain from immigration is low. Our model suggests that large
diﬀerences in age structures do not unambiguously encourage large
factor ﬂows, when the level of factor ﬂows is determined by policy.
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All industrialized countries and many developing countries are facing a de-
cline in birth rates and an increase in life expectancy resulting in population
aging. However, the projected evolution of old-age dependency-ratios in vari-
ous world regions diﬀers widely and thus seems to oﬀer the possibility of large
eﬃciency gains from capital and labor movements. While the United Nations’
report on replacement migration calculates the size of labor movements nec-
essary to oﬀset the eﬀects of aging in low-fertility countries (United Nations
Population Division 2001), the INGENUE (2001) model and the model by
Brooks (2003) simulate the eﬀects of demographic trends on the size of inter-
national capital ﬂows under the assumption that capital is perfectly mobile
while labor is not. Brooks (2003) predicts that the US and the EU will be
large capital exporters until their baby boomers retire around 2020, but that
capital ﬂows would be considerably lower if risk was taken into account. Ad-
ditionally, Facchini and Mayda (2008) make restrictive immigration policies
responsible for low observed international labor ﬂows.
In this paper, we aim to ﬁll a gap and account for endogenous policies. We
investigate whether increasing factor movements is feasible in a world with
two open economies and endogenous policy. In particular, we assume policies
to be determined by the respective median voter’s preferences. The policy
decision in the industrialized country is how many immigrants to admit,
while in the developing country, imported capital can either be expropriated
or not. High emigration from the developing country may change the identity
of the median voter there from young to old, and induce an equilibrium with
no foreign direct investment (FDI). Even if the median voter is always young
in the developing country and old in the industrialized country, marginal
changes in population growth rates alter the politically feasible volume of
immigration and FDI.
In our model, both countries’ policies are interdependent. The larger the
share of capital invested in the developing country, the less immigrants are
admitted to the industrialized country. This is because a larger labor force
abroad implies higher returns on the capital invested there. Lower emigra-
tion from the developing country is equivalent to a higher labor force there.
This has three eﬀects on expropriation preferences. First, the wage loss in
case of expropriation is proportional to the wage level without expropria-
tion, which is lower the lower emigration. Second, returns on FDI (to be
distributed in case of expropriation) rise. These ﬁrst two eﬀects clearly lead
to weaker expropriation preferences. However, third, these returns are dis-
tributed among a larger number of recipients. In our model, expropriation
preferences decrease in emigration, despite the lower number of recipients.
1However, if migration is suﬃciently high to reverse the majority in the de-
veloping country, equilibrium FDI drops to zero.
The results of our model contribute to the understanding of the low level
of factor ﬂows between industrialized and developing countries. We ﬁnd that
labor and capital ﬂows between young and old countries are restricted by poli-
cies. We are also able to capture the notions that less developed countries
receive less FDI and that immigration preferences are driven by economic
as well as non-economic considerations. Furthermore, the existent demo-
graphic diversity does not necessarily induce factor ﬂows. Admitting immi-
grants is more attractive for the industrialized country’s old median voter the
younger the developing country. However, then, expropriation preferences of
the young median voter are higher, at least for a given level of emigration.
The age structure in the industrialized country only aﬀects expropriation
preferences in the developing country via emigration. Furthermore, immi-
gration preferences in the industrialized country do not necessarily increase
with the share of old.
Our analysis draws on two strands of literature. The ﬁrst one deals with
the impediments to capital ﬂows from rich to poor countries. Contrary to
Lucas (1990), Alfaro et al. (2008) ﬁnd that bad institutional quality does
play a major role in explaining the low level of capital investment in poor
countries. Several authors have explicitly dealt with expropriation risk of
FDI, see e.g. Cole and English (1991) and Thomas and Worrall (1994).
Both papers model dynamic games between international investors and a
host-country government under the assumption that investors punish expro-
priation by withholding future investment. The authors ﬁnd that in order
to avoid expropriation, FDI must not exceed a critical threshold. Addition-
ally, Harms (2002) shows in a theoretical model that the taxation of foreign
capital is more likely if the host country is poor.
The second strand of literature we build on is the analysis of endogenous
immigration policy. In the static models by Benhabib (1996) and Mazza and
van Winden (1996), individuals support admitting immigrants if these are
diﬀerent from themselves. Preferences may be reversed if immigrants receive
political rights, which is also an important prediction of the dynamic models
of Dolmas and Huﬀman (2004) and Ortega (2005). In our model, capital
owners’ immigration preferences are limited, although immigrants do not
have any political rights. This is because migration raises the capital intensity
and thus lowers returns on the part of capital invested in the developing
country, although it raises capital returns in the industrialized country. As we
do, Sand and Razin (2007) analyze the impact of aging on immigration and
also on redistribution policy. Since they consider an inﬁnite time horizon, the
median voter’s identity may change not only due to native population aging
2but also due to the immigration of individuals who have more children than
natives. This may restrain the old’s preference for admitting immigrants.
We focus on the eﬀect of marginal changes in the population share of both
generations. In contrast to Sand and Razin, we therefore assume that the
median voter in the industrialized country is always old. Our model is novel
in combining the political economy of immigration and of expropriation risk.
We set up the economic model in section 2. Section 3 analyzes equilibrium
policies, given simultaneity of the investment and migration policy decisions.
In section 4 we examine the impact of marginal changes in parameters on the
equilibrium, while section 5 extends our analysis to the case where investment
takes place after the migration policy decision. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Economic Model
We consider an industrialized country (IC) and a developing country (DC),
both populated by young and old individuals. The size of the total population
is normalized to one in both countries:
N
y + N
o ≡ 1 and N
y∗ + N
o∗ ≡ 1 ,
where the asterisk denotes the developing country’s variables. We assume
that the old are in the majority in the industrialized country, while the
opposite holds for the developing country.










The old generation in the industrialized country owns a capital stock ¯ k ·No.
Meanwhile, the old in the developing country do not own any productive cap-
ital, only an endowment e∗ which they can consume, as in Cole and English
(1991). As Harms and an de Meulen (2009) argue, ﬁnancial institutions are
rudimentary in many developing countries, and savings often take the form
of tangible assets.
Production in the developing country thus hinges on capital inﬂows from
the industrialized country (K∗ = ¯ k · No − K). The young in both countries
exogenously supply one unit of labor. We set depreciation to zero for simplic-
ity.1 We assume that total factor productivity (TFP) in the industrialized
country A exceeds TFP in the developing country. This results from a less
1Note that this simpliﬁcation does not drive our results. In the limiting case with full
depreciation, the net utility gain from expropriation is independent from the level of FDI.
3favorable business climate, for instance a worse infrastructure, in the devel-
oping country. However, investors bring along their expertise. Therefore,
TFP ˜ A exceeds the level A∗ the developing country would achieve without





∗ with 0 < θ < 1 .
Deﬁning M as the migration from the developing to the industrialized coun-
try, factor prices are given by
























in the industrialized and the developing country respectively. Note that
assuming a more general CES production function would allow a wider range
of possible factor price elasticities with respect to migration and FDI. We will
refer to the implications for our model throughout the text.
Expropriation refers to the seizure of the capital stock and is assumed
to be always total. If there were no costs to expropriation, the developing
country would be subject to a classical time-inconsistency problem and would
always expropriate. Consequently, no capital would ﬂow there. However,
expropriation usually comes at some cost. As expropriation leaves foreign
investors without any capital, it is sensible to assume them to withdraw
their expertise, as in Eaton and Gersovitz (1984).2 The seized capital stock
is still used for production. However, TFP drops further below its level in
the industrialized country to A∗, thereby lowering output and the young’s
wages. The old do not incur any cost from expropriation. We assume that
the beneﬁt from expropriation (the gross return to capital) is distributed
equally among the developing country’s old and those young who have not









Immigration to the industrialized country aﬀects its citizens’ welfare in
two ways. First, it alters factor prices. The young generation clearly suﬀers
since wages decline. The old generation beneﬁts from increasing capital re-
turns on the part of capital invested at home k and suﬀers from decreasing
2In a setting with a larger time horizon, one could also argue that expropriation reduces
future capital inﬂows, see Cole and English (1991) and Thomas and Worrall (1994).
4returns on that part invested in the foreign developing country k∗. It is im-
portant to be aware that k and k∗ do not denote the capital intensities in
production (K/L and K∗/L∗) but rather the capital used in home and for-
eign production per investor (K/No and K∗/No). Second, we assume that
immigration causes a disutility dγ to all of the industrialized country’s citi-
zens, proportional to the ratio of immigrants to natives M/(Ny +No) = M.
We assume γ to be equal to one.3 This disutility captures diﬀerent non-
monetary costs related to the integration of immigrants in a tractable way.
Immigration may reduce natives’ utility due to an increased heterogeneity
of social norms and customs as in Hillman (2002). In the presence of social
security, natives may also resent immigration if immigrants are entitled to
beneﬁts, see e.g. Sinn (2005), or if immigration can tilt the political balance




i − d · M and U
i∗ = c














w in case of emigration
w∗ in case of non-expropriation




e∗ in case of non-expropriation
e∗ + t in case of expropriation
.
We assume the sequence of events illustrated in ﬁgure 1. First, the in-
dustrialized country’s old allocate their capital to both countries and at the
same time, the industrialized country’s median voter determines maximum
immigration. Second, the developing country’s young migrate before third,
the developing country’s median voter decides whether to expropriate the for-
eign capital stock. Fourth, production and consumption take place. We solve
the model by backward induction, that is, we start with the expropriation
decision.
3The choice of γ does not have any qualitative eﬀect on our results. With γ = 1,







Figure 1: Sequence of Events
The chosen sequence of events is reasonable for the following reasons.
Expropriation of the capital stock can only take place after capital has been
installed. We assume the expropriation decision to be taken right before pro-
duction starts, that is after capital investment and labor migration. More-
over, it does not matter when labor actually migrates since the size of labor
ﬂows is determined by policy, as we show below. With respect to capital
allocation and migration policy, we begin by assuming simultaneity. One
could also argue that the implementation of migration policy decisions re-
quires a longer lead time than the allocation of capital. We therefore extend
our model to this sequential timing in section 5.
3 Equilibrium Policy
We now come to the determination of the model equilibrium and thereafter,
we investigate the impact of diﬀerent model parameters on the equilibrium.
When deciding whether to expropriate in the third step, the developing coun-
try faces given levels of capital imports K∗ and migration M. If the median
voter is old (because of high emigration, that is M > Ny∗−No∗), any foreign
capital is always expropriated. The young who have not emigrated beneﬁt
from the transfer like the old, but additionally suﬀer from a reduced wage
rate due to a drop in TFP. We deﬁne the non-expropriation constraint K∗max
as the level of FDI for which the median voter in the developing country is in-
diﬀerent between expropriation and non-expropriation. Since an old median
voter always prefers expropriation, we have
K
∗max = 0 , M > N
y∗ − N
o∗ .
A young median voter prefers non-expropriation if the transfer does not
compensate for the wage loss:
(1 − θ)w
∗ > t .









6An inﬂow of capital has three eﬀects, a wage eﬀect (1−θ)w∗, a return eﬀect
K∗ · θr∗/(1 − M) and an eﬀect on the seizable capital stock K∗/(1 − M).
Subsuming the wage and the return eﬀect yields
"
1−θ










Note that the sign of the left hand side is independent from the level of FDI,
K∗. Given that the capital stock eﬀect is non-negative, a necessary condition
for positive FDI for all M between 0 and Ny∗ is that the wage eﬀect is larger
than the return eﬀect, which is fulﬁlled for suﬃciently low θ:
θ < 1 +
1 − α
(1 − α) + αNy∗ .
This means that expropriation has to be costly. Note that relaxing our
assumption of no depreciation would decrease expropriation preferences due
to a lower distributable capital stock. Given that the wage eﬀect is larger
than the return eﬀect, expropriation would never take place in the limiting
case with a depreciation rate of 100%.
From (3) we can derive a critical level of capital imports that serves as


















This is an upper bound because the eﬀect of an inﬂow of capital on the
seizable capital stock dominates the wage and return eﬀects for high levels
of K∗.
We can calculate the derivative of the non-expropriation constraint with





















A necessary and suﬃcient condition for dK∗max/dM > 0 for all M between





which we assume to be fulﬁlled. Emigration has three eﬀects. First, wages
increase and so does the wage eﬀect of expropriation. Second, capital returns
7and the return eﬀect decrease. Both of these eﬀects lower expropriation
preferences. Third, the number or recipients of a possible transfer decreases,
making expropriation more attractive. The parameter θ has two opposing
eﬀects on the derivative dK∗max/dM. Even though the marginal eﬀect on
the wage loss becomes smaller if θ increases, FDI to be distributed in case of
expropriation decreases, as (4) shows.
In summary, expropriation has to be costly for non-expropriation compat-
ible FDI to be larger than zero. However, the non-expropriation compatible
level of FDI only increases in emigration if expropriation costs are not too
high, i.e. if θ is not too low. Note that less elastic wages and capital returns
translate into less elastic costs and beneﬁts of expropriation in equation (3),
implying a larger risk of expropriation. The eﬀect of a growing seizable
capital stock dominates the wage and return eﬀects. Furthermore, weak re-
actions of factor prices may imply that emigration causes a higher preference
for expropriation, since the number of transfer recipients declines.
In the preceding step, the developing country’s young would migrate until
utility and thus wages in both countries are equal, if they faced no migra-
tion restriction. This would yield an emigration constraint. However, in our
model the migration restriction imposed by the industrialized country, the
immigration policy constraint Mmax, turns out to be binding, as we show
below. Immigration policy is determined by the industrialized country’s me-
dian voter, who is always an old individual. Immigration from the developing
country increases the capital return on that part of capital invested in the in-
dustrialized country and decreases the capital return on the part invested in
the developing country. Be aware that foreign capital returns only accrue to
the industrialized country’s investors if K∗ ≤ K∗max. However, the median
voter in the industrialized country anticipates that investors will never invest
more than the non-expropriation compatible level of FDI. For convenience,
we therefore leave the constraint K∗ ≤ K∗max out of the median voter’s
maximization problem. Assuming non-expropriation, maximizing the old’s
indirect utility function yields the following ﬁrst-order condition for every






















Equation (5) illustrates that immigrants are admitted as long as the marginal
gain from immigration, k(dr/dM), outweighs the marginal cost,
−k∗(dr∗/dM) + d. Less elastic factor prices would imply that both these
8marginal gains and costs decrease. Mmax is likely to be lower, especially if
the bulk of capital is invested at home. The ﬁrst-order condition can also be
written as
α(w − w∗)
No = d . (6)
Note that for unrestricted migration the wage rates in both countries are
equal, and the left-hand side is zero. This is a solution for the immigration
policy constraint only if d = 0, i.e. there are no costs of integrating immi-
grants. Intuitively, Mmax must be smaller than unrestricted migration for
any d larger than zero. Hence, we can abstract from the emigration con-
straint as equilibrium migration is always determined by the industrialized
country’s policy. For K∗ = 0, we can show that
M









For any K∗ > 0, we cannot solve explicitly for Mmax. However, the left-hand
side of equation (5) clearly declines with M. With larger capital exports,
investors place a higher weight on foreign capital returns. These become
large for low levels of migration. Therefore, chosen immigration is a declining
function of FDI. Using the implicit function theorem, we can show that the














At the same time with the immigration policy decision, the industrialized
country’s old allocate their capital endowment. In the absence of expropria-
tion risk, they would export the share of capital necessary to equalize capital
returns in both countries. We call the level of capital exports in the absence





α−1¯ k · No(Ny∗ − M)




Obviously, the diﬀerence in capital returns and thus the optimal level of cap-
ital exports is lower the higher immigration, such that K∗opt is a declining
function of M. It is straightforward to understand that no FDI exceeding
the non-expropriation compatible level is an optimal choice. This is be-
cause in case of expropriation, investors only receive a positive return on the
part of capital invested at home. Consequently, utility can be increased by
investing a larger fraction of capital at home and reducing FDI. If the non-
expropriation compatible level of FDI is not suﬃcient to equalize returns,
9it does not pay to further reduce FDI, foregoing high capital returns in the
developing country. Therefore, actual FDI is given by the minimum of K∗opt
and K∗max. We assume that, although investors are atomistic, their capital
is administered by a mutual fund, which ensures that actual total capital
ﬂows to the developing country do not exceed the level compatible with the
non-expropriation constraint.
Our equilibrium is thus characterized by the three equations (4),(5) and
(8), leaving out the emigration constraint since migration is always deter-
mined by the immigration policy constraint. Basically, the model can be
summarized as a game between the industrialized country’s investors and the
industrialized country’s median voter, subject to the non-expropriation con-
straint. The minimum of K∗opt(M) and K∗max(M) is the investors’ best re-
sponse to the median voter’s choice of immigration M. Analogously, the me-
dian voter’s best response to any choice of FDI assuming non-expropriation
is given by the immigration policy constraint Mmax|K∗. The intersection of
best responses then determines a Nash equilibrium. Figure 3 shows the three
equations for α = 0.35, A = 1, A∗ = 0.6, θ = 0.75, Ny = 0.44, Ny∗ = 0.57
and d = 0.18.
























Figure 2: Migration and FDI in Equilibrium
In choosing our benchmark parameters we adhere to common assumptions
10in the literature. According to B¨ orsch-Supan et al. (2003), the production
share of capital is usually set between 0.3 and 0.4, so our benchmark is
α = 0.35. We normalize TFP in the industrialized country A to 1, since
what matters for our analysis is the relative size of A, ˜ A and A∗. According
to Dreher et al. (2007), developing countries’ average TFP relative to the US
is 0.53 if only oﬃcial output is considered and 0.84 if the shadow economy is
also taken into account. We set the developing country’s TFP to A∗ = 0.6
and the industrialized country’s investors’ TFP in the developing country
to the intermediate value ˜ A = 0.8, which yields θ = 0.75. In order to
determine the relative sizes of the young and old generations, we look at
the United Nations’ Population Division’s statistics on children per woman.4
For the period of 2000-2005, total fertility in the world’s more developed
regions was about 1.6, while it was 2.6 for the world’s less developed regions
excluding the least developed regions. With the total population normalized
to one in both countries, the resulting sizes of the young generations are
Ny = 0.44 and Ny∗ = 0.57. We choose the level of the capital stock per
investor to be ¯ k = 0.16, implying an autarky capital intensity of about 0.2
in the industrialized country. The disutility parameter d is, of course, rather
arbitrary since we have not explicitly modeled immigration-related costs. We
call the threshold value of migration for which there remain as many old as
young individuals in the developing country Mcrit = Ny∗ − No∗. We further
deﬁne a critical immigration cost dcrit, which solves the immigration policy
constraint (5) for M = Mcrit and K∗ = K∗max(Mcrit). For any d < dcrit, the
immigration policy constraint and the non-expropriation constraint intersect
at some migration level larger than Mcrit. Consequently, the median voter
in the developing country is young if and only if d ≥ dcrit. Given that all
other parameters are set to their benchmark values, dcrit = 0.14.
Other than in the case of migration, the individually optimal level of
capital exports, K∗opt, is not necessarily higher than the policy-induced level
K∗max. This is the case if the median voter in the developing country is
old, but may not be the case if she or he is young, since then, the former
is a decreasing and the latter an increasing function of migration. How-
ever, we make the assumption that at the critical migration level Mcrit, the
young-median-voter’s non-expropriation constraint binds, i.e. K∗max(Mcrit)
< K∗opt(Mcrit). Then, in any young-median-voter equilibrium, FDI is also
determined by the non-expropriation constraint.
For d > dcrit, ﬁgure 2 illustrates two equilibria, an old-median-voter equi-
librium labeled P and a young-median-voter equilibrium labeled P 0.
4United Nations Population Division (2006)
11Proposition 1 Given that d ≥ dcrit, there is at least a young-median-voter
equilibrium. Additionally, there is an old-median-voter equilibrium for suﬃ-
ciently small d.
Since d ≥ dcrit, the developing country’s young median voter’s non-expropriation
constraint and the immigration policy constraint intersect at M ≤ Mcrit.
This is the young-median-voter equilibrium. It is unique if Mmax(K∗ =
0) ≤ Mcrit. Then, the industrialized country never admits more than Mcrit
migrants and the median voter’s identity in the developing country never
changes. Conversely, if Mmax(K∗ = 0) > Mcrit, P is also an equilibrium,
with an old median voter in the developing country. In P FDI equals zero,
while for migration it holds that Mcrit < M ≤ Ny∗. Note that if migration
does not cause any cost (d = 0), the industrialized country’s median voter
would like to admit an inﬁnite number of immigrants. Nevertheless, Ny∗
must be the upper bound for immigration.
If both equilibria exist, we have to compare the industrialized country’s
old’s indirect utility in order to determine which equilibrium is more plausi-
ble.5 We ﬁnd that the industrialized country’s old always prefer the young-
median-voter equilibrium P 0. Starting from equilibrium P 0 we ask how utility
changes as we move along the immigration policy constraint toward P. The








∗ < 0 ,
where dM > 0 and dK∗ < 0 (see ﬁgure 2). Using the envelope theorem,
∂Uo/∂M = 0, while ∂Uo/∂K∗ > 0 since r∗ > r.
Proposition 2 Given that d < dcrit, there is always an old-median-voter
equilibrium (P). Additionally, there is a young-median-voter equilibrium (P 0)
which is not characterized by the intersection of the policy functions.
Figure 3 shows the case d < dcrit (for d = 0.12). Although with d < dcrit
there is no point of intersection between Mmax and K∗max with positive FDI,
we can show that point P 0 may also be an equilibrium. Intuitively, permit-
ting FDI to be expropriated is never an optimal choice. For any migration
larger than Mcrit, FDI is always expropriated. Consequently, we can only
have an equilibrium with positive FDI (0 < K∗ < K∗max) for migration levels
equal to or below Mcrit. Within this area of possible equilibria, the highest
utility is clearly achieved at P 0, the point closest to utility maximizing K∗opt
5Although both equilibria may be realized, the one which generates higher utility for
both players can be seen as a focal point.






















Figure 3: Equilibrium for d < dcrit
and Mmax. In summary, neither the investors nor the industrialized coun-
try’s median voter have an incentive to deviate from point P 0. While the
investors would like to export more, the median voter favors admitting more
immigrants. However, increasing FDI and admitting more immigrants would
both lead to expropriation.
As in the case where d > dcrit, we thus ﬁnd two possible equilibria, one
equilibrium with positive FDI and a corner solution with an old median
voter in the developing country and no FDI. Other than in the former case,
we cannot rank these two equilibria without further restricting the model
parameters. If the industrialized country’s inhabitants are suﬃciently averse
to immigration, the majority in the developing country is never reversed
by labor ﬂows. However, it is not possible to exclude an old-median-voter
equilibrium theoretically.
4 Comparative Statics
We now come to the eﬀect of marginal changes in the model parameters
on the young-median-voter equilibrium. Changes in the immigration policy
13constraint also apply to the old-median-voter equilibrium, while the old me-
dian voter’s non-expropriation constraint always restricts FDI to zero. In the
absence of political mobility constraints, larger demographic diversity would
clearly boost both capital and labor movements. Now, the level of factor
ﬂows is determined by policy.
A larger share of the old generation in the industrialized country’s popu-
lation implies a larger capital stock ¯ kNo. As No does not have any impact on
expropriation preferences, FDI would only increase if migration rose. How-
ever, a larger share of old does not unambiguously boost migration. With an
exogenous capital endowment per investor ¯ k and given FDI K∗ = K∗max, the
share of ¯ k invested at home must increase. Investors consequently place a
higher weight on domestic capital returns, preferring higher migration. Note,
however, that the impact of immigration on domestic capital returns is also

















¯ k(Ny + M)
¯ kNo − K∗
￿
< 0 .
Intuitively, the marginal eﬀect of migration on the capital return in the in-
dustrialized country may be weakened by a larger share of old because the
capital return itself is lowered not only by a decrease in the labor force but
also by an increase in the capital stock. In summary, it is possible that a
higher fraction of old in the industrialized country implies higher migration
and thereby higher FDI, but this must not be the case. Using, again, the


























For our benchmark parameter values, an increase in No enhances factor ﬂows.
Nevertheless, factor ﬂows are still restrained by policy.
Demographic diversity may also be caused by a high share of young indi-
viduals in the developing country. A larger Ny∗ aﬀects the wage and return
eﬀects of FDI in the same way as lower emigration since both are equivalent
to a larger labor force L∗. Wages decrease while capital returns increase,















14For a given level of migration, our model implies that younger countries have
a higher preference for expropriation. Note that the industrialized country’s
median voter’s preferred level of migration increases with lower FDI. The
direct eﬀect on immigration policy is also unambiguously positive. While
the international allocation of capital is unaﬀected, a larger Ny∗ reduces the
negative marginal eﬀect of emigration on the capital return in the developing
















Ny∗ also has an indirect eﬀect on FDI, via migration. More emigration
counteracts the direct negative eﬀect of Ny∗ on FDI. For our benchmark
parameter values, a larger labor force in the developing country still implies
a lower non-expropriation compatible level of FDI.
The political economy of factor movements is determined by the model
parameters A∗ and θ as well as d. The former two inﬂuence FDI ﬂows via
the cost of expropriation, while the latter raises the cost of immigration the
respective median voter bears. With ˜ A = A∗, no positive level of FDI would
be feasible, whereas immigration is restricted only in case of positive costs of
integrating immigrants. The non-expropriation constraint is relaxed as the







∗max > 0 .
The wage and return eﬀect of FDI both increase by the same factor. Since
the capital stock eﬀect of FDI is not aﬀected by A∗, the costs of expropriation
increase by more than the beneﬁts. Recall that the wage eﬀect is larger than
the return eﬀect for any positive level of K∗max. The relaxation of the non-
expropriation constraint hinges on the wage loss increasing with A∗, which
holds because the productivity gap ˜ A − A∗ = [(1 − θ)/θ]A∗ increases with
A∗. This assumption allows us to replicate the stylized fact that the extent

















Intuitively, the marginal eﬀect of migration on the capital return in the de-
veloping country is enhanced by a larger A∗ because the capital return itself
is higher. The indirect eﬀect on migration via FDI is also negative, such that
15migration unambiguously declines. On the contrary, the positive direct eﬀect
on FDI is counteracted by declining migration.
Note that the productivity gap is also contingent on the parameter θ.
As we do not have any data on this parameter, we also investigate how the
model equilibrium is aﬀected by changes in θ. An increment in θ reduces
the productivity ˜ A, attenuating the wage eﬀect but leaving the return eﬀect











The direct eﬀect on migration is positive. Since ˜ A decreases with θ, the
















Naturally, the higher individuals’ disutility from integrating immigrants,
the more restrictive is immigration policy.6 A policy which lowers this immi-
gration related disutility would not only spur the integration of immigrants
but also protect industrialized countries’ FDI ﬂows. Remember that this only
holds as long as the young are in the majority in the developing country.
5 Extension: Equilibrium Policy in a Sequen-
tial Setting
We now investigate the sensitivity of the model results to the timing of the
capital allocation and migration policy decisions. As we explained in section
2, it is sensible to assume that the expropriation decision takes place last.
Furthermore, equilibrium migration is never determined by migrants’ prefer-
ences, and therefore the timing of their migration decision has no impact on
the equilibrium. As we argued above, it is plausible that the implementation
of migration policy decisions requires a longer lead time than the allocation
of capital. Therefore, we now elaborate on the young-median-voter equilib-
rium with the immigration policy decision taking place before the capital
allocation decision. The old-median-voter equilibrium is not contingent on
the timing. Since a migration level above Mcrit always corresponds to zero
FDI, the optimal immigration level is still given by equation (7).
6Asked about their worries and concerns in the 2007 wave of the German Socio-
Economic Panel (SOEP), 34.44% of respondents said they were very concerned and 46.07%
of respondents said they were somewhat concerned about immigration to Germany.
16In this setting, the old median voter in the industrialized country an-
ticipates how investors react to the immigration policy decision, i.e. K∗ =
min{K∗opt(M),K∗max(M)}, still assuming that capital is administered by a
mutual fund. Recall that we made the assumption that at the critical immi-
gration level Mcrit, and thus for all levels of migration, the non-expropriation
constraint binds. Consequently, the median voter’s decision problem can be
written as
Max
¯ kNo − K∗max(M)
No (1 + r) +
K∗max(M)
No (1 + r
∗) − d · M
where r = αA






















+ (w − w
∗)
￿
= d . (9)
Comparing equation (9) to equation (6), it is easy to verify that migration is
now higher if r∗ > r. The diﬀerence is that the median voter can now loosen
the non-expropriation constraint by choosing a higher level of migration. The
industrialized country’s old favor increasing FDI if r∗ > r, implying that FDI
is restricted by the non-expropriation constraint. In summary, this sequence
of decisions results in higher levels of both migration and FDI.
6 Conclusion
This contribution has explicitly accounted for endogenous policies determined
by immigration and expropriation preferences. It is novel in modeling the
interplay of policies in limiting factor ﬂows. We have set up a one-period
model of two countries with heterogeneous agents, young and old. Account-
ing for demographic diversity, we have assumed an old median voter in the
industrialized country but a young median voter in the developing country.
In equilibrium, factor ﬂows are politically restricted, thus leaving room
for eﬃciency gains from removing mobility barriers. E.g. if the immigration-
related disutility that natives incur can be lowered, both migration and FDI
increase. This clearly enhances eﬃciency. This result is subject to one caveat,
as there is the possibility that emigration changes the median voter’s identity
in the developing country. Then FDI drops to zero, as the expropriation
of any foreign capital is certain. We therefore conclude that even though
migration protects an aging country’s stock of FDI, the aging country does
not beneﬁt from completely depriving host countries of their labor force.
17While larger demographic diversity would boost factor ﬂows in the ab-
sence of mobility constraints, it does not have an unambiguous eﬀect in our
setting. A large size of the old generation in the industrialized country im-
plies that a large share of capital has to be invested at home. Capital returns
achieved at home thus receive a higher weight, enhancing immigration pref-
erences. However, it is possible that the positive eﬀect of migration on these
capital returns is now weaker. If migration does increase, this also has an
indirect positive eﬀect on FDI. A large size of the young generation in the
developing country has an unambiguously negative eﬀect on FDI and an un-
ambiguously positive eﬀect on migration. It is equivalent to a large labor
force, implying low wages, and low wage losses in case of expropriation, and
high capital returns to be distributed in case of expropriation. The positive
eﬀect on migration stems from the fact that high capital returns also lead to
a reduced negative marginal eﬀect of emigration. Enhanced migration does
at least attenuate the negative eﬀect on FDI.
The model may further be extended in various directions. First, we could
allow for economic mobility barriers. If moving is costly for the migrants, our
results do not change, unless the (political) demand for migrants would then
exceed individually optimal migration. Second, a wider range of elasticities
could be allowed for in production. With weaker factor price eﬀects, factor
ﬂows would be further restricted, and migration might not ease expropriation
risk. Third, since in industrialized countries much of the debate concerning
migration and capital investment is related to the sustainability of pensions
systems, it would be promising to introduce a pension system to the model.
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